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In his reply, David-Hillel Ruben (2014) argues that “internal perspectives” on disputes 
over true succession (i.e. of the parties involved) might well rely on counterfactuals, but 
that “external perspectives” (i.e. of scholars) ought to dispense with them because they 
are hard to verify.  
 
I think Ruben is right in this regard. Moreover, I do not wish to object to his overall 
argument that social disputes over true succession are intractable because true succession 
is inherently vague. However, I still tend to consider Ruben’s account incomplete 
because the category of vagueness alone does not fully explain why disputes over true 
succession are essentially contestable.  
 
Ruben brings up the following hypothetical case: Two rivals in a dispute over true 
succession, having read his (Ruben 2013) article, are both convinced that true succession 
is inherently vague. They agree that theoretically there may be more than one true 
successor of the revered originator. Ruben thinks that “the recognition of vagueness is not 
likely to end the dispute between the parties” (Ruben 2014, 55), and empirically 
speaking, he is probably right. But the theoretical question is why the dispute is unlikely 
to be ended in spite of the recognition of vagueness, and under what conditions the 
recognition of vagueness might force one of the disputants to abandon his or her claim to 
true succession. 
 
Imagine that the disputants, after acknowledging the possibility of multiple equally true 
successors, insist on their respective claim to true succession, arguing that their respective 
beliefs are more like the earlier paradigm than the rival’s. They might do so for various 
reasons, “internal” as well as “external” ones. Concerning the former, they might justify 
their claim by reference to exclusive divine revelation, and so the dispute is doomed to 
defy rational resolution. At best, the disputants could agree to tolerate or ignore each 
other’s claims. However, especially in non-religious (e.g. scholarly) disputes over true 
succession, the disputants will usually consider reference to non-rational knowledge 
illegitimate, and thus agree that an “external” arbitrator (i.e. rationality) is the adequate 
instance to assess the legitimacy of claims. If so, “internal” and “external” perspectives 
merge, and what is more, the dispute can well be ended in a rational way: A comparative 
analysis of the propositional content of the writings of the originator and each disputant 
may reveal that one rival’s writings objectively exhibit a greater degree of qualitative 
similarity than the other’s.  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this consideration: Firstly, even though theoretically 
speaking there are numerous possibilities for true succession in every single case, most 
empirical disputes are susceptible to rational resolution unless the writings of two 
disputants turn out to have the same degree of qualitative similarity with the originator’s 
writings, which is unlikely to say the least. Secondly, we should not assume that the 
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unwillingness of disputants to acknowledge the inherent vagueness of true succession and 
reluctance to let rational analysis decide the issue is the reason why many social disputes 
are so intractable. Much more likely, the disputants sustain their respective claim to true 
succession in spite of a commitment to the authority of rationality because they rely on 
different rational methods of assessing qualitative similarity. 
 
The comparative analysis of propositional content is certainly a reasonably rational 
method of assessing qualitative similarity, despite the various criticisms that have been 
levelled against this “Oxford approach” (Skinner et al. 2002). Yet a great variety of 
methods of interpretation as theorized and practiced in literary criticism as well as the 
history of philosophy and political thought are viable candidates, too. (Post-structuralist 
approaches that proclaim the death of the author as well as certain reader-response 
approaches are probably exceptions.) Each approach may reveal more than one possible 
way of being faithful to an originator, which is why vagueness is an important part of a 
comprehensive explanation of the intractable nature of social disputes, and vagueness 
may ultimately also lie at the ground of the multiplicity of methods of interpretation. (If 
so, in the final analysis, many social disputes over true succession might be reducible to 
the on-going scholarly controversy about the appropriate way of reconstructing the 
meaning of a text.) Yet unless different methods of interpretation are adopted, a social 
dispute will usually be capable of rational resolution. 
 
On a related note, to conclude, one might ask whether approaches that aim at ascertaining 
the authorial intention of texts are not fairly reasonable attempts to operationalize in a 
scholarly manner the category of counter-factual approval, and may thus – contrary to 
what I admitted above – be a legitimate part of “external perspectives.” 
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